


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CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700523



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 23 May 1970*

**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**


*For the President Only*

~~Top Secret~~

# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970

Weekly average for each month




FEBRUARY - MAY 1970

Weekly data as reported


## US BATTLE DEATHS

were significantly lower at 143 contrasted with last week's 217.




## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

declined again to 308 from last week's 380. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.




## INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

remain at zero for the week. Recent intercepts, however, reveal that Hanoi intends to place at least three new battalion size groups in the pipeline during the coming week.




## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

increased sharply to 1050 from last week's 822 reflecting the expected upsurge in harassing attacks.





## ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

decreased to 3321 from last week's 3737.



## SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces rose to 68% from last week's 60%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

In South Vietnam, attacks by fire and limited ground probes early in the week increased the level of enemy-initiated activity as anticipated, but were less intense than the attacks in other recent upsurges. The Communists are now attempting to prepare for the final phase of their "spring" campaign scheduled for the first week in June, but continue to be plagued by supply problems and thrown off balance by pre-emptive Allied operations.

In Laos, monsoon-like rains throughout the country hampered both friend and foe during the past week and no significant gains were made by either side. The Communists still appear intent on maintaining their forward positions in north Laos while continuing to apply pressure in the south.

Allied search operations in Cambodia are still encountering only light enemy opposition but are causing further retrenchment by the enemy and are reducing Communist pressures in several areas of the country. Revised data on the volume of enemy materiel captured in Cambodia thus far indicate that ammunition losses amount to between 52% and 88% of the estimate of enemy stockpiles of ammunition in Cambodia at the start of Allied operations. These losses equate to about 72% of the enemy ammunition captured in South Vietnam last year. Loss of these supplies has inflicted a sharp blow to the enemy's logistical system in Cambodia, but it must be remembered that the enemy retains intact stockpiles in Laos and South Vietnam and has the capability to mount a major resupply effort to rebuild the supplies lost to the Allies.

#### Enemy Infiltration

Although no new groups were observed in the pipeline during the week, enemy communications reveal that at least three battalion-size groups are scheduled to enter the pipeline during the coming week. If they are in fact inserted, these three groups, totaling nearly 1,800 men, will be the first normal infiltration groups to start south in over six weeks. The significance of their entrance into the system cannot yet be determined. The number of infiltrators entering the pipeline since 23 October 1969 remains at some 58,000-59,500.

#### South Vietnam Developments

An added dividend from the Cambodian operation has been a spate of Communist ralliers and prisoners in the border area, including a deputy commander of Sub-Region 2, the chief of the cryptographic unit of SR-2 headquarters, a member of COSVN's Finance-Economy section, and a cadre from COSVN's J-3 signal office. Interrogation of these cadres in depth should considerably improve our knowledge of the Communist command structure.

The government's carrot and stick approach to domestic dissent seems to be producing at least temporary surface calm, as only low-key protest activity by the students and veterans occurred last week. Some student violence may occur later this week, however, in response to an alleged request by the American National Students Association that the Saigon Student Union support the 30 May anti-war demonstrations in the U.S. by staging complementary demonstrations in Saigon a day or two before the student demonstrations in the U.S.

Despite historically-rooted animosities that are still strong, a number of liaison channels have been established between Vietnamese and Cambodian officials. (These are in fact so numerous and uncoordinated, on both sides, that they clearly contain adverse potential for duplication, confusion, and irritation.) Military liaison ranges from casual exchanges between commanders in the field to formal contacts between the two general staffs; permanent military missions are planned on both sides. In the civilian sector, the GVN is represented in Phnom Penh by the Foreign Ministry, a refugee mission, and the Central Intelligence Organization. In addition, there have been direct meetings between Cambodian officials and Vice President Ky, with Ky initially acting in a self-appointed role not entirely to President Thieu's liking. However, both Thieu and Ky are now beginning to work in concert and Ky will represent the GVN on a visit to Phnom Penh to ratify the accords drawn up by the GVN and Cambodian Foreign Ministers. Other problems connected with these poorly coordinated channels will be discussed with Thieu by Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams when they meet on 27 May.

Communist Developments

Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement on Indochina and a massive rally the following day underscored Peking's support for Sihanouk and the Indochinese People's struggle, but did not hint at any change in China's cautious and prudent approach to military involvement in the conflict. In the present situation, Peking seems to be attempting to gain some of its foreign policy objectives by militant propaganda involving no risk. Peking would clearly like to expand its influence in Hanoi, and Indochina, and concomitantly see Moscow's influence reduced. While its action commitments to date have been typically cautious, Peking is obviously intrigued by the potential recent developments may offer, especially Cambodian developments, for improving its position in Indochina, at Moscow's expense, and perhaps hastening the forced withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia.

~~Top Secret~~